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19 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

the father was not a proper person to have its custody, still, so far
as jurisdiction of the court over the child is concerned, that would
seem sufficient as against the parent who is actually in the jurisdiction of the court, as was the case in the principal case.
The other consideration is that the divorce proceeding was a
proceeding in equity, and that the relief obtainable there is as a
matter of favor and not a matter of absolute right.3 Thus equity
might in its'discretion withhold relief to the complainant upon condition that he do equity, and he cannot complain if equity attaches
conditions to the relief which he prays unless such conditions be
inequitable.
As applied to the principal case, the complainant does not complain of the decree because it is inequitable, but solely because he
assails the jurisdiction of the court to impose the conditions. Therefore, the presumption may be indulged that complainant was not a
fit person to have the custody of the child and further that it was
no more than fair that he should contribute something toward its
support. If he obtained his divorce as a matter of equitable favor,
then it would follow that he, at least, cannot complain, if under
such circumstances the court imposed equitable conditions to his
obtaining it.
ELMER M.

LEESMAN.

RHODE ISLAND
EVIDENCE-IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES-BIA.-P

brought
an action for injuries to his automobile resulting from a collision
with the automobile of D; at the trial P read the deposition of an
insurance adjuster who had examined the damaged car; this deposition had been taken by D, but was not used by him; in rebuttal D.
called P and was permitted to ask him whether this adjuster did
not represent the insurance company which had insured the car.
Held, error. Brody v. Cooper.1

This ruling was put on the grounds: (1) that by taking the
deposition D made the witness his own so as to prevent his impeachment of him; (2) that in any event he was not entitled to prove the
bias of the deponent without first having laid the proper foundation
by cross-examination as to such alleged bias.
Proof that P had insurance against accidents was not admissible
on the issue of contributory 'negligence. At most it would only
tend to show that P had less reason or motive to be careful. But
the slight evidential value of this fact would be more than overbalanced by the probable misuse of it by the jury.2
The fact that the Witness was a representative of the insurance company which was interested in the action under the doctrine
of subrogation would naturally affect his credibility.3 The relation3. Jennings v. Kotz 299 Ill. 472; Herczeg v. Weiss 304 Ill. 551.

1. Rhode Island 124 Atl. 2.

2. Capital Co. v. Holtmarn 27 D. C. App. 125; Sawyer v. Arnold Shoe
Co. 90 Me. 369; Dempsey v. Goldstein 121 N. E. (Mass.) 429.
3. Capital Co. v. Holtman supra; Cady v. Lang 115 Atl. (Vt.) 140.

COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

ship of the witness to a party interested in the action, if otherwise
receivable for the purpose of affecting his credibility, would not be
rendered inadmissible
because it also disclosed that P had insurance
4
on his car.
The common statement that a party 'vouches' for the credibility
of his own witness and therefore can not impeach him, is subject to
a number of qualifications.
It is now uniformly held that a party may always prove a contrary state of facts by other witnesses, though the effect is to discredit his own witness in whole or in part. 5
It is also generally agreed that if a party's own witness turns
out to be adverse, what amounts to a cross-examination may be permitted, and under the guise of refreshing his memory he may be
interrogated to prior contradictory statements. 6
Where the witness admits making such contradictory statements
and does not furnish a satisfactory explanation, he is bound to be
discredited more or less; and according to the view of the Supreme
Court of the United States the examination is allowed for the very
purpose of discrediting him.7

Whether a party is permitted to prove by other witnesses that
his own witness has made contradictory statements is a matter on
which "courts have differed, and opinions may vary to the end of
time.""
Lord Denman allowed a party thus to contradict his own witness and the ruling was affirmed by a divided court. 9 Lord Denman's view, that the general rule, prohibiting a direct attack on
the character of one's own witness, did not exclude proof of
contradictory statements, was substantially embodied in the 17 and
18 Vict. c. 125 s. 22, quoted in Putnam v. United States, supra, and
the question thus set at rest in England.
In the United States there is much conflict on this point. A
majority of the cases disapprove such contradiction; unless the party
was "entrapped" by the witness, 0 or unless there was collusion
between the witness and the adverse party."1 It is easy to understand a certain instinctive feeling which -probably gave rise to the
rule prohibiting a party from attacking the character of his own
witness. He was thought of as attempting to perpetrate a fraud on
the court when he put forward a witness as ostensibly credible, but
whose character he was prepared to attack in case of unfavorable
testimony. This notion seems to have little application to proof of
contradictory statements, and less to proof of bias. The main objec4. Dempsey v. Goldstein 121 N. E. (Mass.) 429.
5 Bradley v. Ricardo 8 Bing. 57; Cochburn v. Hawkeve Ass'n. 143 N. W.
(Ia.) 1006; Moultrie v. Hall 120 Ga. 730; Municipal Court v. Kirby 28 R. I.
287.
6. Merlhurl. v, Collier 15 Ad. & El. (N. s.) 878; Bullard v. Pearsall
53 N. Y. 230; Consol. Coal Co. v. Seniqer 179 Ill. 370.
7. Putnam v. U. S. 162 U. S. 687.
8. Merlhuisli v. Collier, supra.
9. Wright v. Becket 1 Moody & R. 414.'
10. Moultrie v. Hall 120 Ga. 730.
11. Clancy v. Transit Co. 192 Mo. 615.
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tion urged to proof of contradictory statements is the danger that
the jury may make a hearsay use of them, a danger equally applicable
to similar contradiction of a witness of the adverse party, which is
allowed as a matter of course. No plausible reason has been suggested for excluding proof of bias. Most of the courts appear to
have taken it for granted that the rule against impeaching your
own witness by proof of bad character applies equally to proof of
bias.'12

The majority of the cases support Professor Wigmore's view
that the mere fact that A takes a deposition, which he does not offer
to use, does not make the deponent the witness of A so as to prevent
impeachment, when the deposition is read by B.13
A party who merely takes a deposition, which he does not use,
has never put the witness forward as worthy of belief. The nile
that a foundation must be laid by cross-examination of a witness
before he can be impeached by proof of contradictory statements was
first announced in the Queen's Case,' 4 though the advisory opinion
of the judges indicates that the practice had prevailed for some
time in the trial courts. This rule seems to be based largely on the
idea of fairness to the witness, who might not otherwise have an
opportunity to explain an actual or apparent discrepancy in his
statements. So where it is sought to prove the bias of a witness by
his declarations showing hostility or the like, the same reasons may
require a foundation by cross-examination. The statements may
have been misunderstood, or may be susceptible of some explanation which the witness alone can give. For this method of proving
bias, the cases quite generally require a foundation to be laid.'5
But where it is sought to prove facts, such as interest, relationship
or the like, the reason for requiring a prior cross-examination wholly
fails. 16 In the principal case the distinction seems to have been
overlooked.
EDWARD W. HINTON.
WISCONSIN
TORTS-PARENT'S LIABILITY FOR CHILD'S ToRTs.-Hopkins v.
Droppers,' which ruled that a father may become liable for his son's
torts under circumstances not creating an agency, gives rise to reflections on some related aspects of our legal system, and this case is
a suitable text for expounding the "firstly," "secondly," and
"thirdly," that are involved.
12. Wiginore "Evidence" 901 and cases there cited.
13. Wigntore "Evidence" 913; Cadsworth,v. Ins. Co. 4 Rich. (S. C. Law)
416; Neil v. Childs 10 Ired. (N. C.) 195; Richnond v. Richmond 10 Yerg.
(Tenn.) 343; City v. Osterlee 139 Ill. 120 (semble).
14. (1820) 2 Brod. & Bing. 284, loc. 312 et seq.
15. Pagan v. Lentz 156 Cal. 681.
16. People v. Brooks 131 N. Y. 321; People v. Litstiq 206 N. Y. 162;
People v. Michalard229 N. Y. 325; State v. Smith 183 N. W. 873.
1. Wisconsin 198 N. W. 738.

